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McKee, Circuit Judge.  
Davis seeks habeas review of his state convictions arising from charges that he 
sexually abused a minor. He seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 based on several claims 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The District Court concluded that the claims 
were either procedurally defaulted or had been correctly decided by the reasonable 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and under I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
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application of Supreme Court precedent in state court. App. 1-2, 20-26. For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm the district court.1 
I.  
Davis argues he is entitled to the narrow exception fashioned in Martinez v. Ryan 
to excuse procedurally defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.2 In 
Strickland v. Washington,3 the Supreme Court held that a defendant claiming a violation 
of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel must show that “counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness,”4 and that there is “a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.”5   
For the purposes of this appeal, we will assume that Davis’s claims fall within the 
narrow Martinez exception. We nevertheless hold that he is not entitled to relief because 
none of his three claims of ineffectiveness satisfy Strickland.  
A. 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. Our review is plenary and will apply the 
same standard used by the district court because it did not conduct an evidentiary hearing.  
Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 280 (3d Cir. 2016).   
2 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (requiring that (1) the claim has some merit and (2) collateral review 
counsel was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington). 
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
4 Id. at 688. 
5 Id. at 694. 
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The victim (C.H.) did surprise defense counsel during cross examination by 
disclosing that she “wrote days down when [they] had sex” in her journal, and this 
allowed the prosecutor to admit the journal entry.6 However, counsel elicited the 
unexpected response through a reasonable line of questioning. He was attempting to 
impeach C.H. based upon inconsistencies in her testimony on direct. App. 115-16, 123, 
127. Although Davis now claims that this “opened the door” to the prosecutor admitting 
the journal entry, counsel’s questions were a reasonable way to undermine C.H.’s 
credibility.7   
  Moreover, counsel made a reasoned decision not to move for a mistrial. “[A] 
court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct . . . might be considered 
sound trial strategy.”8 Here, we cannot assume a mistrial would have been granted given 
the court’s willingness to grant only a continuance to allow trial counsel an opportunity to 
examine the surprise entry. App. 147-48. Moreover, counsel may well have considered 
the fact that a retrial would provide an opportunity for C.H. to refresh her recollection 
and to explain the apparent discrepancies between her journal entries and testimony.  
 
6 App. 116. 
7 Appellant’s Br. 40. Trial counsel did not claim that the portions of the journal were 
withheld in bad faith and the prosecutor offered to produce testimony that would 
establish that the omission was inadvertent. Thus, trial counsel’s decision to cross 
examine C.H. about inconsistencies between her testimony and journal entries was not 
only reasonable but necessary. Davis had to raise a reasonable doubt about C.H.’s 
truthfulness. The inconsistencies arising from the journal entries clearly seemed like the 
best (and perhaps only) way to do that. 
8 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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B. 
Similarly, trial counsel’s failure to object to questions insinuating he was a drug 
dealer also fails to satisfy Strickland. Had trial counsel objected, the prosecutor may well 
have been able to introduce Davis’s pending drug charges and C.H.’s statement to 
forensic interviewers at the Children’s Hospital: “I don’t know (didn’t know) what he’s 
capable of cause he’s a drug dealer and stuff.”9 Such evidence, combined with the fact 
that Jefferson had a history of drug addiction, may have been a proper foundation for the 
prosecutor’s drug dealer inquiries. It was clearly better to simply allow Jefferson and 
Davis to deny those insinuations than to risk allowing the jury to hear evidence that 
would have established a proper foundation for those questions. 
C. 
Finally, Davis contends trial counsel was ineffective for not introducing evidence 
that C.H. had an intact hymen. This also fails the first Strickland prong. Davis argues that 
the medical staff described C.H.’s hymen as “thick [and] redundant” with “no notches” 
and “no lesions.”10 The exam report also contained an assessment that “there were no 
physical findings of abuse.”11 But that ignores the fact that the report qualified that 
statement by explaining that “80–90% of children with known sexual abuse have normal 
 
9 Appellee’s Br. 39.  
10 App. 429. 
11 Id. at 434. 
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exams due to the elasticity [and] distensibility of the hymenal tissue.”12 The report 
cautioned that “[t]he medical findings are not conclusive to support or disprove 
allegations of abuse.”13 
Thus, the fact that C.H.’s hymen did not evidence trauma is inconclusive and fails 
to establish prejudice as required by Strickland. Perhaps more importantly, the visit 
summary states that C.H. went to the hospital “due to [a] series of alleged sexual assaults 
[over] past 5-6 months . . . [by an] adult male – allegedly mom’s drug dealer . . . .  
Reports vaginal, oral, anal intercourse.”14 Accordingly, not only was the hospital record 
inconclusive as to C.H.’s trauma, part or all of it may have been admissible against Davis 
as a prior consistent statement by C.H. Whether or not the court would have allowed that, 
it clearly was reasonable—and probably advisable—for trial counsel to avoid wading into 
those troubled waters.  
II.  
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of 
Davis’s habeas petition. 
 
12 Id.   
13 Id. at 434.   
14 Id. at 431. 
